The set_page_locked() function has changed its name again.
2.6.28 offers __set_page_locked() instead, which uses non-atomic
__set_bit() to do the work. In this case, offer our own
set_page_locked() using the atomic set_bit(), because I do not know
if atomic access is really necessary. Atomic behaviour is the one
previously expected.
Signed-off-by: Pekka Paalanen <pq@iki.fi>
I wanted to avoid doing this, as it's a bunch of churn, but there was a
conflict between the dri_ symbols in libdrm and the symbols that were in
Mesa in 7.2, which broke Mesa 7.2 AIGLX when the 2D driver had loaded new
libdrm symbols. The new naming was recommended by cworth for giving the
code a unique prefix identifying where the code lives.
Additionally, take the opportunity to fix up two API mistakes: emit_reloc's
arguments were in a nonsensical order, and set_tiling lacked the stride
argument that the kernel will want to use soon. API compatibility with
released code is maintained using #defines.
This relies on a new kernel ioctl to get the available aperture size.
In order to provide reasonable performance from dri_bufmgr_check_aperture, we
now require that once a buffer has been used as the target of a relocation,
it gets no further relocations added to it. This cuts the cost of
check_aperture from 10% to 1% in the 3D driver with no code changes, but
slightly complicates our plans for the 2D driver.
This turns the various nvXX_graph_init_ctxvals() methods into tables,
and speeds up compliation of nv50_graph.c quite a bit. This has bothered
me for a while, but others are complaining now so it's time to fix it :)
The drm_compat.c version of kmap_atomic_prot_pfn() uses the macro
pgd_offset_k(), which references the symbol init_mm.
Starting in 2.6.25, init_mm is no longer exported by default.
The only user of kmap_atomic_prot_pfn() is i915, so this should
not hurt anyone, and it allows people to load drm.ko.
Signed-off-by: Pekka Paalanen <pq@iki.fi>
Olaf Kirch noticed that the i915_set_status_page() function of the i915
kernel driver calls ioremap with an address offset that is supplied by
userspace via ioctl. The function zeroes the mapped memory via memset
and tells the hardware about the address. Turns out that access to that
ioctl is not restricted to root so users could probably exploit that to
do nasty things. We haven't tried to write actual exploit code though.
It only affects the Intel G33 series and newer.